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We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We
identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always
has optimal strategies in games from this subclass, and second, these games are strongly determined.
The subclass is defined by the property that the set of all values can only have one accumulation point
– 0. Our results nicely mirror recent results for finitely-branching games, where, on the contrary,
Player Min always has optimal strategies. However, our proof methods are substantially different,
because the roles of the players are not symmetric. We also do not restrict the branching of the games.
Finally, we apply our results in the context of recently studied One-Counter stochastic games.
1 Introduction
Two-player turn-based zero-sum stochastic games, simply called “games” in this text, evolve randomly in
discrete transitions from one of countably many states to another. The winning condition is some prop-
erty of such infinite evolutions. Each state is either owned by Player Max, Player Min, or it is stochastic,
and has a fixed set, possibly infinite, of available outgoing transitions. The states and transitions define a
game graph, an infinite path in this graph is called a run. The set of runs comes with a product topology
over the discrete state space, i.e., open sets are generated by sets of runs sharing a common finite prefix.
In stochastic states, the successor is sampled according to a fixed distribution, whereas players choose
successors in states they own, based on the history of the play so far. This induces a probabilistic measure
for Borel-measurable sets of runs in a natural way.
A winning condition is a set W of runs. A run from W is won by Player Max, the other runs are won
by Player Min (the games are zero-sum). For Borel measurable sets W , a fixed pair (σ ,pi) of strategies
for Player Max and Min, respectively, and an initial state, s, the probability that Max wins is denoted by
P
σ ,pi
s [W ]. The value of the game in s, denoted by Val(s), is defined as
Val(s) := sup
σ
inf
pi
Pσ ,pis [W ] = infpi supσ
Pσ ,pis [W ] . (1)
The above equality, a consequence of a more general, Blackwell-determinacy result of Martin [12],
implies that for every ε > 0 both of the players have so called ε-optimal strategies, σε and piε , such that
infpi Pσε ,pis [W ]≥ Val(s)−ε , and supσ P
σ ,piε
s [W ]≤Val(s)+ε . This may not be true for the case when ε = 0,
where the optimal (i.e., 0-optimal) strategies may not exist for neither of the players.
We consider a stronger notion of determinacy than (1), and call a game strongly determined if for
every state s, every ν , 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1, and ⊲ ∈ {>,≥} either Player Max has a strategy σ¯ such that ∀pi :
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P
σ¯ ,pi
s [W ]⊲ν , or Player Min has a strategy p¯i such that ∀σ : Pσ ,p¯is [W ]⋫ ν . Denote L := supσ infpi P
σ ,pi
s [W ]
and R := infpi supσ P
σ ,pi
s [W ], then if Max has a strategy σ¯ such that ∀pi :Pσ¯ ,pis [W ]≥ ν then ν ≤ L. Similarly,
if Player Min has a strategy p¯i such that ∀σ : Pσ ,p¯is [W ]≤ ν then ν ≥ R. By strong determinacy, ∀ν :¬(R >
ν > L), thus R ≤ L. L ≤ R follows from definitions, thus strong determinacy implies determinacy. On
the other hand, it is easy to see that the existence of ε-optimal strategies for both players implies strong
determinacy for cases where |ν −Val(s)| ≥ 2ε , the players simply use their ε-optimal strategies to win.
This works even for ε = 0, thus whenever both players have optimal strategies, the game is strongly
determined (for all ν). To sum up the relation between the key three notions: Every game with a Borel
winning condition is determined in the sense of (1), some of these games are strongly determined, and
some of the strongly determined games are those admitting optimal strategies for both players. Example 1
and [7, Fig. 1] show that both the inclusions are proper. More precisely, in the game from Example 1,
which we show later, Player Min has only one (trivial) strategy, thus the game is strongly determined.
However, there is a state r0, such that for every fixed strategy of Max the probability of winning is
strictly below Val(r0). The game from [7, Fig. 1], is composed of two halves, one of which is essentially
equivalent to the game in Example 1, and the other is a similar game adopted for Min (infinite branching
needed). As a consequence, neither Player Max in the first half, nor Min in the second half have optimal
strategies. Thus, fixing a strategy of one player first, which is ε-optimal, the other player may choose an
ε/2-optimal strategy to beat the first player. As a consequence, no player has a winning strategy.
We are especially interested in the situation when W is an open set, and call such games open as
well. This includes all reachability conditions, where W is the set of all runs visiting a state from a
distinguished set of target states, T . For reachability, results of [7, 6] imply (see Corollary 1) that Player
Min has always optimal strategies if every state, s, owned by Min has at least one successor, t, such that
Val(s) = Val(t). This is always the case in finitely-branching games, where all states have only finite
number of successors. On the other hand, even in very simple reachability games where every state has
at most 2 successors, Player Max may not have an optimal strategy (cf. Example 1). Our main result
gives a condition sufficient for the existence of optimal strategies for Player Max.
Theorem 1. Let G be an open stochastic game. Player Max has an optimal strategy in all states, if
the set Vε := {Val(s) | s is a state of G ∧Val(s)≥ ε} is finite for every ε > 0. (∗)
In particular, G is not assumed to be finitely-branching. Condition (∗) is just saying that the set
V := {Val(s) | s is a state} has no accumulation points, or the only such point is 0. It is a trivial task
to construct a game where none of the players owns a single state, i.e., a Markov chain, and where the
set V contains other accumulation points than 0. In Markov chains, however, each player has only one,
trivial, strategy, which must thus be the optimal one. This shows that (∗) is not necessary. However,
there are at least two reasons for which (∗) is interesting: First, we identify a class of recently studied
infinite-state stochastic games which satisfy the assumption of Theorem 1, and for which the existence
of optimal strategies for Max was not known before. This class, properly described later, consists of
games generated by One-Counter automata [3, 2, 4], which satisfy a certain additional property, which
can be tested algorithmically. As a special case, this class involves a maximizing variant of Solvency
Games [1].
Second, in Examples 1 and 2, we show games where Player Max lacks optimal strategies. These
games are rather simple, and violate (∗) only “very slightly”, in particular, they (1) are finitely-branching,
and in fact have both the out-degree and in-degree of the game graph bounded by 2, (2) do not contain
states of Player Min at all, (3) all transition probabilities in stochastic states are uniformly distributed,
and (4) V has only one accumulation point. This point is 1 in Example 1, and 1/2 in Example 2. In the
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latter case, the accumulation point is approached only from above, and V ∩ [0,1/2) = {0}. Thus it is not
possible to weaken the assumption (∗) in Theorem 1 by allowing other accumulation points than 0.
As noted before, both players having optimal strategies implies strong determinacy. But even for
finitely-branching reachability games strong determinacy still holds, although Player Max may not have
optimal strategies, and only Player Min always does [7]. Interestingly, we show here that under (∗),
where Max has optimal strategies, and Min may not have such, strong determinacy survives.
Theorem 2. Let G be an open stochastic game satisfying (∗). Then G is strongly determined.
Related work and open questions. Blackwell games are more general than our stochastic games,
players there choose their moves simultaneously, not knowing the concurrent choice of the opponent. A
famous determinacy result in the sense of (1) for Blackwell games is given in [12]. Finitely-branching
reachability games have been studied as a theoretical background for some algorithmic results concern-
ing BPA games (i.e., games with graphs generated by stateless pushdown automata) in [7, 6]. Finite-state
reachability stochastic games were studied in [8]. In view of existence of optimal strategies and strong
determinacy, finite-state games are not interesting: optimal strategies always exist there. However, the
precise complexity of associated computational problems for these games is a long-standing and inter-
esting open problem.
Theorem 2 and the results from [7, 6] give us two classes of strongly determined games: games
satisfying (∗), and finitely-branching games, respectively. Neither of these two classes is contained in
the other. The most interesting question in our opinion is whether the following conjecture is true; and if
it is not, for which, as weak as possible, restrictions on W and/or G it becomes true.
Conjecture 1. Let G be a stochastic game, and W a winning condition, such that Player Max (or Player
Min) has an optimal strategy in every state of G . Then G is strongly determined.
We do not even know whether the conjecture is true for all games where W is a reachability condi-
tion. Other open questions include finding new interesting classes of games where one of the players is
guaranteed to have optimal strategies.
Outline of the paper. We briefly formalise the necessary notions, and recall some important known
facts in Section 2. In Section 3 we prove Theorem 1 in the special case of games without Player Min.
Both theorems are then proved in full generality in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we briefly explain
what are One Counter games, and apply our results to them.
2 Preliminaries
As noted in the Introduction, we use the simple term “games” for our special kind of games (Definition 2).
Because we do not speak about other games here, we hope the reader will excuse us for this inaccuracy.
Definition 1. A game graph, G = (S,→ ,δ ), has a countable set S of states, partitioned into sets S0, S1,
S2 of stochastic states, states of Player Max, and Player Min, respectively; a countable transition relation
→ ⊆ S× S such that ∀r ∈ S : ∃s ∈ S : r→s; and a probability weight function δ : S0× S → [0,1] such
that for all r ∈ S0 we have ∑r→s δ (r,s) = 1.
A run is an infinite path in a game graph. For a finite path w, we denote the states it visits by
w(0),w(1), . . . ,w(k), and call k = len(w) the length of w. Run(w) is the set of all runs extending w.
Unions of sets of the form Run(w) are called open sets, they are open in the product topology over the
discrete spaces S. Closing the set of open sets under complements and countable union defines the set of
(Borel-)measurable sets.
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Definition 2. A game, G , is given by a game graph, G, and a Borel-measurable set of runs, W , called the
winning condition. If there is some T ⊆ S so that W =
⋃
{Run(w) | w ends in T} then W is a reachability
condition, and G is called a reachability game.
A strategy for Player Max is a function assigning to every finite path (called a history) ending in a
state s ∈ S1 a distribution over the successors of s. Similarly, a strategy for Min is defined for histories
ending in S2. A strategy is memoryless, if it only depends on the last state of the history.
Fixing a pair of strategies, (σ ,pi), for Max and Min, respectively, we assign to every finite path, w,
the product, ρσ ,pi(w), of weights on the edges along w given by δ , σ , and pi . Fixing also an initial state,
s, we define a probability measure Pσ ,pis [·] by Pσ ,pis [Run(w)] := 0 for w not starting in s, Pσ ,pis [Run(w)] :=
ρσ ,pi(w) for w starting in s, and extending this to complement and union to satisfy the axioms of a
probability measure. The uniqueness of this construction is a standard fact, see, e.g., [13, p. 30].
The definition of the value, Val(·), given in (1), has thus been formalised. For ε ≥ 0, a strategy, σ ,
for Max is ε-optimal in a state s if Pσ ,pis [W ] ≥ Val(s)− ε for all strategies, pi , for Min. The ε-optimal
strategies for Min are defined analogously. We call 0-optimal strategies just optimal.
2.1 Technical Assumptions
Although a game graph, in general, may have an arbitrary structure, we can always transform it to be a
forest, without changing the properties of the game, by keeping track of the history inside the states. More
precisely, given a game G = (G,W ), G = (S,→ ,δ ), consider a game G ′ = (G′,W ′), G′ = (S′, →֒ ,δ ′),
where the states in S′ are just finite sequences of states from S. In particular, S ⊆ S′, and whenever r→s
in G then wr →֒wrs in G ′. Projecting the states of S′ to their last component induces a map, φ , from
paths in G′ to paths in G. We set W ′ := φ−1(W ). The map φ also induces a map, Φ, from strategies in G
to strategies in G ′, by sending histories through φ . Naturally, the partition of S′, and the weight function
δ ′ are both derived from S and δ by projecting states from S′ to the last component.
It is easy to verify that for every s ∈ S, if we restrict the game graphs of G and G ′ to states reachable
from s, then φ is clearly bijective and preserves measurability in both directions. Also Φ is bijective,
and for all measurable A ⊆ Run(s), and all pairs (σ ,pi) of strategies: Pσ ,pis [A] = PΦ(σ),Φ(pi)s [φ(A)] . As a
consequence, Val(s) is the same in G and G ′ for all s ∈ S, and the sets of all values in G and in G ′ are
equal. Also, W is open iff W ′ is a reachability condition. Every strategy in G ′ is memoryless, because G′
is a forest. Finally, once we have a reachability objective, with the target set T , we may clearly assume
without loss of generality, that all states in T are absorbing. This shows that to prove Theorems 1 and 2
we may safely assume the following:
Assumption 1. The game graph is always a forest, all strategies are memoryless, and the winning
condition is a reachability condition specified by some target set T ⊆ S, such that for all t ∈ T the only
edge leaving t is t→ t.
2.2 Known Results for Reachability Games
We state here some known results to be used later. The following gives a characterisation of values, and
allows us to characterise the existence of optimal strategies for Min.
Fact 1 (cf. [7, Theorem 3.1]). Let G = (G,W ), G = (S,→ ,δ ) be a game, with W = ⋃{Run(w) |
w ends in T}. The least fixed point of the following (Bellman) functional V : (S → [0,1])→ (S → [0,1])
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Figure 1: A reachability game where Player Max ( states) has no optimal strategy.
exists and is equal to Val(·).
V ( f )(s) =


1 if s ∈ T
sup{ f (r) | s→ r} if s ∈ S1 \T
inf{ f (r) | s→ r} if s ∈ S2 \T
∑s→r δ (s,r) · f (r) if s ∈ S0 \T
Corollary 1 (cf. [7, Theorem 3.1]). Let G be a game as in Fact 1. Let G′ = (S, →֒ ,δ ) be a subgraph
of G where →֒ is a subset of → , and if there is a pair r,s ∈ S such that r→ s and r 6֒→s then r ∈ S2 and
there is some s′ ∈ S such that r →֒ s′ and Val(s′)≤ Val(s) in G . Let G ′ = (G′,W ). Then the values are the
same in G and G ′.
As a consequence, a strategy, pi , for Min is optimal iff for all r ∈ S2 it chooses with positive probability
only successors s ∈ S satisfying Val(r) = Val(s).
Proof. Let V ′ be the Bellman functional associated with G ′. Observe that the values in G form a fixed
point of V ′, thus for all s ∈ S, Val(s) in G ′ is equal to or less than Val(s) in G ′. Moreover, it cannot be
less, because Player Max has the same set of strategies in G ′ as in G , whereas Player Min does not get
more strategies in G ′. To derive the consequence, remove all edges not used by pi .
Note that the situation is not symmetric for Player Max. Consider games without Player Min, and
with out-degree and in-degree bounded by 2. In particular, this implies that every state, r, of Player Max
has at least one successor, s, with Val(r) = Val(s). Even in these games, Player Max may lack optimal
strategies, as illustrated in the following classical (see, e.g., [4, p. 871],[5, Example 6]) example.
Example 1. Consider the reachability game from Figure 1. Its game graph, G, has the set S := {ri,si, ti |
i ≥ 0} of states, partitioned by S0 = {si, ti | i ≥ 0}, S1 = {ri | i ≥ 0}, and S2 = /0. Transitions are s0→s0,
t0→ t0, and ri−1→ri, ri→si, si→si−1, si→ ti, and ti→ ti−1 for i > 0. Probabilities are always uniform.
The target set is T = {t0}. Clearly, Val(si) = 1−2−i for all i≥ 0. Thus Val(ri) = 1 for all i≥ 0: for every
N > 0, choosing the transition ri→ri+1 for i < N, and the transition ri→si for i ≥ N, is a 2−N-optimal
strategy for Max. Yet Max has no optimal strategy in any ri, i ≥ 0: no strategy reaching some s j is
optimal, and, on the other hand, never reaching s j means never reaching t.
3 Games without Player Min
Proposition 1. Let G = (G,W ) be a stochastic game, where G = (S,→ ,δ ) and S2 = /0, 1 and W is open.
If (∗) from Theorem 1 is satisfied then Player Max has an optimal strategy in all states.
1 These are also sometimes called (minimizing) Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), see, e.g., [3, 2, 13].
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We fix the game G from Proposition 1 in the rest of this section, devoted to proving the proposition.
By Assumption 1, G is a forest, and there is T ⊆ S such that W =
⋃
{Run(w) | w ends in T} and for all
t ∈ T there is only one transition: t→ t. The proof is by contradiction, in three steps. First, we prove that
if there is a state with no optimal strategy, then there must be a state from which winning with probability
sufficiently close to the optimum implies the need to use some value decreasing transition. A transition
r→ s is value decreasing if Val(r) > Val(s). Second, we will argue that the potential “damage” caused
by this transition is positive and bounded away from 0, independently of the actual strategy. Third, we
show that (∗) implies that the potential “damage” factor is indeed bounding the probability of reaching
T away from the value, which is a contradiction with the definition of the value.
We introduce a random variable, L (for “loss”). For a run, ω , a losing index is every i, such that
ω(i) ∈ S1 and Val(ω(i))> Val(ω(i+1)). If there is no losing index for ω , we set L(ω) := 0. Otherwise,
there is the least losing index, i, and we set L(ω) := Val(ω(i)) > 0. Finally, we say that a state s ∈ S is
losing if there is some δs > 0 such that for every δs-optimal strategy, σ , in s, we have Pσs [L > 0]> 0.
Lemma 1. Assume (∗). If ∃s ∈ S such that ∀σ : Pσs [W ]< Val(s) then there is also some losing state.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume there is no losing state, we construct an optimal strategy in every state.
Define a subset →֒ of the transition relation → of G , by setting for every pair r,s ∈ S: r →֒s iff r→s and
either r ∈ S0, or Val(r) = Val(s). Observe that (∗) implies that for all r ∈ S1 there is at least one s such
that r →֒ s and Val(r) = Val(s). Thus →֒ is total and G′ = (S, →֒ ,δ ) is a game graph. Without losing
states, for every r ∈ S and every ε > 0 there is some ε-optimal strategy, σ , such that Pσs [L > 0] = 0, i.e.,
σ does not use value-decreasing transitions. This strategy works in G ′ = (G′,W ) as well, winning with
the same probability, as in G . The values in G and G ′ are thus the same.
Consider now G ′. Denote by FPk(s) the set of all finite paths of length k starting in s. Due to the last
sentence in Assumption 1, and because →֒ preserves value, the following is true in G ′:
∀k ≥ 0 : ∀σ : ∀s ∈ S : Val(s) = ∑
w∈FPk(s)
Pσs [Run(w)] ·Val(w(k)). (2)
For all s ∈ S fix a 1/4 ·Val(s)-optimal strategy σs. After some ns ≥ 0 of steps, T must be reached from s
under σs with probability at least Val(s)/2, as Pσss [W ] = limk→∞Pσs [{Run(w) | len(w)≤ k∧w(k) ∈ T}] .
For all s ∈ S we finally construct a strategy σ for G ′, optimal in s. Because the values are the same
in G and G ′, and every strategy for G ′ is also a strategy for G , this will finish the proof of the lemma.
The strategy σ starts in s according to σs, and follows it for ns steps. After that, having arrived to some
state r, it switches to σr and follows it for other nr steps. This is repeated ad infinitum. The invariant (2),
and the choice of nr and σr for r ∈ S, guarantee that after the m-th stage of the above repetitive process,
T has actually been reached with probability (1−2−m) ·Val(s), proving that σ is optimal.
For every losing state, s∈ S, and every constant ε > 0 we define ℓεs := inf{Eσs [L] |σ is ε-optimal in s}.
Since ℓεs ≤ ℓ
ζ
s ≤ 1 for ε ≥ ζ , the limit ℓs := limε→0 ℓεs exists.
Lemma 2. Assume (∗). For every losing state, s, in G we have ℓs > 0.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume that s is losing and ℓs = 0. To every strategy σ which may possibly
use value-decreasing transitions r→ r′ where Val(r) > Val(r′) we consider a strategy σ¯ , which copies
the moves of σ until a value-decreasing transition is chosen. From that point on, just before the value-
decreasing transition, the strategy σ¯ keeps choosing arbitrary successors with the only requirement that
they preserve the value, i.e., whenever σ¯ chooses a transition s→ s′ with a positive probability, Val(s) =
Val(s′). Such a choice always exists, because sups→s′ Val(s′) = Val(s), and either Val(s) = 0, in which
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case Val(s′) = 0 for all s′, s→s′, or Val(s) > 0, and by (∗) Val(s) > 0 cannot be an accumulation point,
so there is some s′, s→s′ with Val(s) = Val(s′). Observe that for every σ , Pσs [W ]−Pσ¯s [W ] ≤ Esσ[L] . As
a consequence, due to ℓs = 0, Val(s) = sup{Pσ¯s [W ] | σ is some strategy}. This contradicts s being losing,
since Pσ¯s [L > 0] = 0 for every σ .
Proof of Proposition 1. By contradiction. Assume (∗), and that there is some r ∈ S with no strategy
optimal in r. By Lemma 1, there is a losing state, s ∈ S. By Lemma 2, ℓs > 0. Choose some ε > 0 such
that ℓεs ≥ ℓs/2 > 0. Thus under every ε-optimal strategy, σ , with some positive probability, p > 0, a state
r ∈ S1 with Val(r)≥ ℓεs is visited, and some transition r →֒r′ with Val(r′)< Val(r) is taken. Observe that
(∗) gives us the following “value-gap”:
δ := inf{|Val(r)−Val(r′)| | r,r′ ∈ S,Val(r) 6= Val(r′),Val(r)≥ ℓεs}> 0.
This allows us to bound p independently of σ , since ℓεs ≤ Esσ[L]≤ p ·1+(1− p)(ℓεs −δ ) and hence
p≥
δ
1+δ − ℓεs
> 0.
Thus for every strategy, σ , we have that Val(s)−Pσs [W ]≥min{ε ,δ · p}> 0. This clearly contradicts the
definition of Val(s). The proof is finished.
4 Reachability Games
In this section we prove Theorems 1 and 2. Let us fix a game G = (G,W ), where G = (S,→ ,δ ),
satisfying Assumption 1. Also assume that W is open, and thus there is T ⊆ S such that W =
⋃
{Run(w) |
w ends in T}. We call a state s safe if ∀σ for Max : ∃piσ for Min : Pσ ,piσs [W ] = 0. The following lemma
states the strong determinacy restricted to states with value 0, and will be useful in proving each of both
theorems.
Lemma 3. If G satisfies (∗) then for every safe s ∈ S: ∃pi for Min : ∀σ for Max : Pσ ,pis [W ] = 0.
Proof. We cut off some choices for Min in the game graph G of G , and obtain its sub-graph G′, so that all
states reachable in G′ from s have value 0 in G ′ = (G′,W ). In particular, no run can satisfy W . Because
the choices of Max remain unrestricted in G′, this ensures that the probability of W is 0 in G as well. Let
us proceed in more detail.
Observe that every safe state has value 0, so no safe state is in T . Also, observe that for every safe
r ∈ S0∪S1 and s ∈ S, if r→s then s is safe. Likewise, if r ∈ S2 is safe, then there must be a safe s such
that r→ s. Fix a safe s, and define G′ as the smallest sub-graph of G containing s and satisfying that if r
is in G′, then so is every safe successor r′ of r in G. As shown above, G′ is a game graph, the probability
assignment δ from G is valid in G′ as well, and all states in G′ are safe. Hence, no paths in G′ visit T , and
the value of every state in G ′ is 0. Fix an arbitrary strategy pi for Min in G ′ = (G′,W ), then Pσ ,pis [W ] = 0
for all σ of Max in G ′. All transitions out of safe states of Max were preserved in G′, and pi is also a
strategy in G , so we have Pσ ,pis [W ] = 0 also for every σ of Max in G .
4.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 4. If G satisfies (∗), then for all s ∈ S we have: ∀pi for Min : ∃σ for Max : Pσ ,pis [W ]≥ Val(s).
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Proof. For every (memoryless, due to Assumption 1) strategy pi of Player Min, we denote by Gpi the game
where the choices of Player Min are resolved using pi . Formally, Gpi = (G′,W ), where G′ = (S′, →֒ ,δ ′),
and (1) S′= S but comes with a different partition: S′0 = S0∪S2, S′1 = S1, S′2 = /0, (2) the relation →֒ ⊆ →
is given by r →֒s iff r→s and either r ∈ S0∪S1, or r ∈ S2 and pi(r)(s) > 0, and (3) δ ′ = δ ∪pi . For every
strategy σ for Player Max, and every s ∈ S the measure Pσ ,pis [·] in G obviously coincides with Pσs [·] in
Gpi . Thus we may apply Proposition 1 to all Gpi to derive the lemma.
Consider now the following game H = (H,W ), which is a slight modification of G . The set of
states of H = (S, →֒ ,δH) is S, the same as in G, and with the same partition. There is a transition r →֒s
iff exactly one of these three situations occurs: Val(r) = 0 in G , and s = r; or Val(r)> 0, r ∈ S0 and r→s;
or Val(r)> 0, r /∈ S0, r→ s, and Val(r) = Val(s) in G . In other words, in H we made all states with value
0 absorbing, and only left value preserving transitions for players. Finally, δH is the only probability
weight function which coincides with δ on stochastic states with positive value.
Lemma 5. If G satisfies (∗), then H is a game graph, and the values are the same in G and H .
Proof. We refine the modifications from above into three steps, obtaining game graphs H0 = G, H1, H2,
and H3 = H . We will show for each i ∈ {1,2,3} that Hi is a game graph, and that the values are the same
in Hi = (Hi,W ) as they are in G . All the graphs constructed have the same set of states, S, and the same
partition, as G, and the same weight function, δH , as H .
H1 = (S, 7→ ,δH), and r 7→ s iff Val(r) = 0 in G , and s = r, or Val(r) > 0 and r→ s. H1 is clearly a
game graph, because 7→ is total. The values did not change, because each absorbing loop outside of T has
value 0. Moreover, every r ∈ S2 has always a successor with the same value. Indeed, if Val(r) = 0 then
r itself is its own successor in G1; if Val(r) > 0 then infr 7→s Val(s) = Val(r), and by (∗), since Val(r) > 0
cannot be an accumulation point, there is some s, r 7→ s with Val(r) = Val(s). By Corollary 1, Min has
optimal strategies in H1.
H2 = (S, ,δH), and r s iff r 7→s and either Val(r) = 0 in G , or r /∈ S2, or (if Val(r) > 0 and
r ∈ S2) Val(r) = Val(s) in G . Because Min has always value-preserving transitions in H1, H2 is clearly
a game graph, and by Corollary 1 all strategies of Min in H2 are optimal. Fix one such pi for Min, and
an arbitrary s ∈ S. By Lemma 4 there is a σ for Max in G (and thus also in H2 = (H2,W )) such that
P
σ ,pi
s [W ]≥ Val(s). Because pi is optimal, σ cannot choose value-decreasing transitions. Thus, even when
only using edges in →֒ , i.e., from H3 = H , we still obtain that infpi supσ P
σ ,pi
s [W ] = Val(s). Thus also the
graph H is a game graph, and the values in H and G are the same.
Lemma 6. If G satisfies (∗), then Player Max has an optimal strategy, σ , in H .
Proof. We first describe σ , then we prove that it is optimal. In every state, s, there is some 1/2 ·Val(s)-
optimal strategy, τs, for Max. We call a history (i.e., a finite path), w, starting in some state s, and ending
in r, lazy, if Val(r)> 0 and infpi Pτs,pis [W | Run(w)] = 0. Observe that each history, w, can be uniquely split
into a sequence of sub-paths, divided by single states, w = s0w0s1w1s2 · · · skwk, k ≥ 1, si ∈ S, wi ∈ S∗,
such that for all i < k, siwisi+1 is lazy, and for all i≤ k, siwi is not lazy. We call k the laziness index of w,
written laz(w) and skwk the non-lazy suffix of w. We now define σ for a history w with a non-lazy suffix
skwk by σ(w) := τsk(skwk).
Now we prove that σ is optimal. To do so, we need to extend the laziness index to runs. For a run, ω ,
we set Laz(ω) := sup{laz(w) | ω ∈ Run(w)} ∈ N∪{∞}. Thus we defined a random variable, Laz. We
prove the following claim, which clearly implies the statement of the lemma:
∀s ∈ S : ∀pi for Min : ∀k ≥ 0 : Pσ ,pis [W ∧Laz≤ k]≥ Val(s) · (1−2−k). (3)
68 Optimal Strategies in ∞-state Stochastic Reachability Games
By induction on k. Fix some s ∈ S, and a strategy, pi , for Min. Clearly, (3) is true for k = 0. Also it is
true when Val(s) = 0. Assume thus Val(s)> 0 and k = ℓ+1 for some ℓ≥ 0. We set L to be the set of all
finite paths, w, such that laz(w) = k and the non-lazy suffix only consists of one state. Denote by last(w)
the last state of w. Observe that, by the definition of σ and τsk ,
∀w ∈ L : ∀pi for Min : Pσ ,pis [W | Run(w)]≥ 1/2 ·Val(last(w)). (4)
Let Λ be any prefix-free set of finite paths such that Pσ ,pis [
⋃
w∈Λ Run(w)] = 1. Because H only contains
value-preserving edges for players, we have
Val(s) = ∑
w∈Λ
Pσ ,pis [Run(w)] ·Val(last(w)). (5)
We have p := Pσ ,pis [W ∧Laz≤ ℓ] ≥ Val(s) · (1− 2−ℓ), by the inductive hypothesis. We also have q :=
∑w∈LPσ ,pis [Run(w)] ·Val(last(w)) = Val(s)− p, by (5). By (4), Pσ ,pis [W ∧Laz = k]≥ q ·1/2. Finally,
Pσ ,pis [W ∧Laz≤ k] = Pσ ,pis [W ∧Laz≤ ℓ]+Pσ ,pis [W ∧Laz = k]
= p+q ·1/2 = p+(Val(s)− p) ·1/2 = p/2+Val(s)/2
≥ (2−1−2−(ℓ+1)) ·Val(s)+Val(s) ·2−1 = (1−2−(ℓ+1)) ·Val(s).
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the strategy σ from Lemma 6. It partially defines a strategy in G . To
complete its definition, we now specify it for histories containing a transition of the form r→ s, where
r ∈ S2 and Val(s) > Val(r), by requiring σ to behave as a 1/2 · (Val(s)−Val(r))-optimal strategy since
that point. Fix an initial state, s, and consider an arbitrary strategy, pi , of Min. If pi is optimal, then it is
also valid in H , and Pσ ,pis [W ] = Val(s) by Lemmata 5 and 6. For a non-optimal pi it is easy to verify that
P
σ ,pi
s [W ]> Val(s) by both the definition of σ , and Lemmata 5 and 6.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
If both players have optimal strategies, the game is strongly determined. However, even under Condi-
tion (∗), Player Min may not always have an optimal strategy, because of states with value 0, without
value-preserving transition for Min available. See the game in [7, Fig. 1] restricted to states reachable
from s, for an example. Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of Lemma 7 and Lemma 9, where the former
lemma deals with all “easy cases”, and the latter “patches” the above deficiency by using Lemma 3 to
deal with states with value 0, and “restoring” the optimal strategies for both players in the rest.
Lemma 7. Assume that G satisfies (∗). Let s ∈ S, 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1, and ⊲ ∈ {>,≥}. Assume that either
Val(s) = 0, or ν 6= Val(s), or⊲=≥. Then either Player Max has a strategy σ¯ such that ∀pi : Pσ¯ ,pis [W ]⊲ν ,
or Player Min has a strategy p¯i such that ∀σ : Pσ ,p¯is [W ]⋫ ν .
Proof. The case when ν = Val(s) = 0 is solved by Lemma 3. If ν < Val(s), we can choose any 1/2 ·
(Val(s)−ν)-optimal strategy for Max as σ¯ . Similarly, if ν >Val(s), we can choose any 1/2·(ν−Val(s))-
optimal strategy for Min as p¯i . If ν = Val(s) and ⊲=≥, we can choose any optimal strategy for Max as
σ¯ . Such a strategy exists due to Theorem 1.
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It remains to solve ν = Val(s)> 0 and ⊲=>. We do two preprocessing steps on G to first obtain G ′,
and then H . In H both players will have optimal strategies, and we will be able to lift such a strategy
for Min back to G iff Max does not have a strategy ing G to always win with probability > Val(s).
We fix s ∈ S with Val(s)> 0 and set R := {r ∈ S | Val(r) = 0∧∃σ¯ : ∀pi : Pσ¯ ,pir [W ]> 0}. Intuitively, if
Max does not have a strategy to always win with probability > Val(s), then Min can always respond to
a strategy σ of Max with a piσ , so that R is not visited at all from s under these strategies, and yet Max
wins with probability at most Val(s). Thus, if we cut off all states from R, producing the game H , we
obtain a valid game graph, and the values of states will not change.
Before we describe this formally, we observe that neither of the players benefits from using transi-
tions which do not preserve the value. Let G ′ = (G′,W ), G′ = (S, 7→ ,δ ) be a game given by restricting
the edges of G to value-preserving where possible: for all r,r′ ∈ S we require that r 7→ r′ iff r→r′ and
either r ∈ S0∪R, or Val(r) = Val(r′).
Lemma 8. Assume that G satisfies (∗). Then the values in G and in G ′ are the same, and for all s ∈ S,
each of the following is true in G ′ if it is true in G :
∀σ for Max : ∃piσ for Min : Pσ ,piσs [W ]≤ Val(s), (6)
∀pi for Min : ∃σpi for Max : Pσpi ,pis [W ]> Val(s). (7)
Proof. By Theorem 1, there is an optimal strategy, σ , for Min. This is also a strategy for G ′, thus for
all s ∈ S, Val(s) in G ′ is at least Val(s) in G . On the other hand, by Corollary 1, cutting off non-optimal
edges leaving states from S2 \R does not alter the values. Further, cutting off non-optimal edges from S1
could only decrease the values. Thus, for all s ∈ S, the values in G ′ and G are equal.
Now we fix some s ∈ S, and prove that if (6) is true in G then it is true in G ′. Let σ be a strategy
for Max in G ′, i.e., it is a strategy for G which does not use value-decreasing edges. If σ is optimal,
then the strategy piσ from (6) in G necessarily has to use value-preserving edges everywhere, and thus
it is valid in G ′ as well. If σ is not optimal, consider again the response piσ of Min to satisfy (6) in G .
If piσ cannot be used directly in G ′, then there must be some r ∈ S2 \R where piσ chooses a successor r′
with Val(r′) > Val(r). But because r /∈ R, there must also be a successor r′′ such that Val(r′′) = Val(r).
We modify piσ to a pi ′σ , which chooses for all such r the value-preserving successor instead of r′, and
continues as a 1/2 · (Val(r′)−Val(r))-optimal strategy in G ′. Clearly, Pσ ,pi
′
σ
s [W ] ≤ Pσ ,piσs [W ] in G , and
since pi ′σ is also a strategy in G ′, (6) is true in G ′ as well.
Finally, we prove that if (7) is true in G then it is true in G ′. Let pi be a strategy in G ′. Fix the choices
of pi in G ′ outside of R to define a game Gpi . By Corollary 1, Gpi has the same values as G . Thus, optimal
strategies of Max in Gpi exist, because Gpi satisfies (∗), and only choose edges preserving the value in
G . Consider the strategy σpi witnessing (6) in G . We now define a strategy σ ′pi in G ′: it copies moves
of σpi in G ′, unless σpi chooses some value-decreasing edge. In that case, instead of following σpi , σ ′pi
immediately switches to some optimal strategy for Gpi . Since the values in Gpi are the same as in G , this
only increases the probability of winning, thus Pσ
′
pi ,pi
s [W ]≥ Pσpi ,pis [W ] .
Lemma 9. Assume that G satisfies (∗). For all s ∈ S such that Val(s) > 0, if
∀σ for Max : ∃piσ for Min : Pσ ,piσs [W ]≤ Val(s), (8)
then
∃pi for Min : ∀σ for Max : Pσ ,pis [W ]≤ Val(s). (9)
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Figure 2: Left: A game, G , where player
Max () does not have optimal strate-
gies. All stochastic (©) states have uni-
form distribution on outgoing transitions.
Right: A One Counter description of G .
Signed numbers represent counter incre-
ments.
Proof. By Lemma 8, if (8) =⇒ (9) in G ′ then the implication holds in G as well, and if G satisfies (∗)
then so does G ′. Thus we focus on G ′ instead. We describe the modification of G ′, called H , where we
cut off R. By Att(R) we denote the set of all states, r, such that in G ′ Max has a strategy, σ , such that for
all pi for Min, Pσ ,pir [Reach R]> 0. Further, we consider the edge relation →֒ , which is simply the relation
7→ without edges leading to states from Att(R).
We fix some s, Val(s) > 0, satisfying (8), and by S′ we denote the subset of all r ∈ S to which there
is a path from s in the graph (S, →֒). Consider a game graph, H = (S′, →֒ ,δ ), inheriting the partition
of states from G. The edge relation is the →֒ defined above, only restricted to S′× S′. Observe that if
r ∈ S′0∪S′1 and r→ r′ for some r′ ∈ S, then r′ ∈ S′. This is because r /∈ Att(R) implies r′ /∈ Att(R) if r is
not owned by Min. Similarly, for all r ∈ S′2 there is a r′ ∈ S′ such that r →֒ r′. Thus δ , restricted to S′, is
still a valid probability weight function, and H is a valid game graph. We abuse the letter W to denote a
restriction of W to H , and define a game H = (H,W ).
Because all edges leaving states from S2 \R were value-preserving in G ′, Corollary 1 yields that the
values stay the same in H as they were in G ′, and there is an optimal strategy, p¯i for Min in H . This is
also a strategy for G ′, and because the choices of Player Max were not affected when reducing G ′ to H ,
we obtain, that for all σ for Max we have Pσ ,p¯is [W ]≤ Val(s) both in H and in G ′. This proves (9).
5 One Counter Games
One Counter stochastic games (OC-SSGs), see, e.g., [3, 2, 4], are games played on transition graphs of
one-counter automata. Such automata have a finite control-state unit, Q, and a set of rules, which are
triples of the form (r,k,s) with r,s ∈ Q and k ∈ {−1,0,+1}. States of an OC-SSG are then of the form
sn where s ∈ Q is a control state, and n ≥ 0 is an integer, representing the counter value. Transitions are
generated by setting ri→s j if i > 0 and there is a rule (r, j− i,s). Moreover, states with counter 0 are
made absorbing, s0→s0, to reflect that the system halts with the empty counter. The partition of states
is induced by a partition of Q, and the probabilities of transitions out of stochastic states, are induced by
probabilities on rules. OC-SSGs come with an implicit reachability objective, the set to be reached is the
set {s0 | s ∈ Q} of states with counter 0. Because the system halts in 0 we also call this a termination
winning condition.
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Example 2. In the right-hand part of Figure 2 we give the one-counter automaton with the set Q =
{s,u,d,r,z, t} of control states. An unlabelled edge, like s→u, represents a 0-rule, e.g., (s,0,u). A label
(±1) represents the counter change, e.g., the loop t→ t represents (t,+1, t). The square-state s belongs
to Max, other states are stochastic. The distributions on outgoing transitions are implicitly uniform in
this example. In the left-hand part is the generated OC-SSG. Grey states are to be reached. Later in this
section we will show that Val(si) = 2
i+1
2i+1 , but no strategy of Player Max is optimal in si. Observe that
1/2 = limi→∞ 2
i+1
2i+1 is an accumulation point in the set of all values.
Note that every OC-SSG has bounded out-degree and in-degree, in particular it is finitely branching.
Thus Min has always optimal strategies in OC-SSGs. However, they may not always satisfy (∗), and
Example 2 shows that in OC-SSGs, Max may have no optimal strategies. On the other hand, the structure
of the accumulation points in the set of all values is well understood for OC-SSGs. To describe it, we
need to introduce another winning objective.
In OC-SSGs there is an implicit boundary on the counter value – if it reaches zero, the system halts.
However, we may also interpret the one-counter automaton as a directed graph on Q, with the rules as
edges with rewards. This way we obtain a finite game graph. Accumulating those rewards along a run in
such a game graph then corresponds to observing the counter in the OC-SSG, with the exception that the
counter does not stop in 0 and may get negative. Adding the winning condition (for Max) that the liminf
of the accumulated rewards be −∞, we just defined (LimInf =−∞)-games.
In [2, 4] it was shown that both players always have pure and memoryless optimal strategies in
(LimInf =−∞)-games, and the optimal value is always rational and computable. Observe that the ter-
mination values, Val(sn), for a fixed s ∈ Q, are non-increasing with increasing n. Thus their limit exists,
and, in fact, it is an easy exercise to employ the results of [2, 4] to prove that the (LimInf =−∞)-value
of a control state, s, equals limn→∞ Val(sn). Intuitively this is because, with increasing the initial counter,
n, the objective of reaching 0 becomes more and more similar to the (LimInf =−∞) objective. Thus the
set of (LimInf =−∞)-values of all states s ∈ Q contains the set of all accumulation points of the termi-
nation values. It is also possible to decide in time polynomial in |Q| whether a (LimInf =−∞)-value, ν ,
actually is an accumulation point, i.e., whether for all states, s, with (LimInf =−∞)-value ν the limit of
termination values stabilises after finitely many steps.
Corollary 2. Let G be an OC-SSG with the set Q of control states. If for every s∈Q the (LimInf =−∞)-
value of s is 1 or 0, then Player Max has an optimal strategy for termination in G .
Proof. The limits of termination values are approached from above, because Val(sn) ≥ Val(sn+1) for all
s ∈ Q and all n≥ 0. Thus, 1 is not an accumulation point, and we may apply Theorem 1.
Note that the class of OC-SSGs satisfying the condition of Corollary 2 involves all OC-SSGs where
the graph of rules is strongly connected, and one of the players is missing. This is because (LimInf =−∞)
is a prefix independent objective, and the strong connectivity allows the only player to reach each control
state almost surely, thus all control states have the same (LimInf =−∞)-value. By results of [11, Theo-
rem 3.2], such a common value can only be 0 or 1. In particular, Corollary 2 covers both the Solvency
games, see [1], and their maximizing variant.
In Solvency games, a gambler has an initial positive amount of money, and in each step chooses
one of finitely many actions. Each action is associated with a distribution on a finite set of integers. A
number from this set is then sampled, and added to the sum of money owned by the gambler (it can be,
however, negative), and the process ends only when the wealth becomes ≤ 0. This is easily modelled
by one-player OC-SSGs (see [4]), and these have strongly connected graphs of rules, because the only
state where the gambler chooses the action, is reachable from all other states. The natural scenario is,
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obviously, with Player Min for these games, and there the existence of optimal strategies follows from
the finite branching. However, the dual situation, with Player Max, is theoretically interesting as well,
and we are not aware of any result prior to our Corollary 2, indicating the existence of optimal strategies
for Player Max.
5.1 Analysis of Example 2
Consider an arbitrary n ≥ 1. It is easy to see that Val(rn) = 12 . Observe that starting in un, sn+1 is visited
with probability ∑∞i=0 2−1−2i = 23 , and sn−1 with probability 13 .
Lemma 10. For the unique strategy, σ , not using transitions sn→rn, n≥ 1, we have Pσsi[W ] = 2
−i.
Proof. Clearly Pσs0[W ] = 1= 2−0. Further, the assignment x :=Pσs1[W ] is the least non-negative solution of
the equation x= 23 +
x2
3 , see, e.g., [9, Theorem 3.4] or [10, Theorem 1], which is 12 . Solving the recurrence
Pσsi[W ] =
2
3 ·P
σ
si−1[W ]+
1
3 ·P
σ
si+1[W ] , given the initial conditions for i = 0,1, yields P
σ
si[W ] = 2
−i.
Lemma 11. Val(s1) = 34 .
Proof. First we prove Val(s1)≥ 34 . For any n consider the memoryless strategy, σn, given by σn(si)(ui) =
1 if i < n and σn(si)(ri) = 1 if i≥ n. Set pi := Pσis1[Reach si] . Observe that pi does not change if we define
it using any σn with n ≥ i, and that 1− pi = Pσns1 [W ∧¬Reach si] for n ≥ i. Moreover, p1 = 1 and
pi+1 := 23 · (pi +(1− pi) · pi+1) . This uniquely determines that pi =
2i−1
2i−1 . Finally, observe that P
σn
s1 [W ] =
(1− pn)+ pn · 12 , thus Val(s1)≥ limn→∞(1− pn)+ pn ·
1
2 =
3
4 .
Now we prove that Val(s1)≤ 34 by proving P
σ
s1[W ]≤
3
4 for all σ . Consider the following probabilities:
pa := Pσs1[W ∧¬Reach some r j], pb := P
σ
s1[W ∧Reach some r j], pc := P
σ
s1[Reach some r j]. Clearly pb =
pc
2 . Due to Lemma 10 applied to i = 1 we also have that pa ≤
1
2 . Finally, pa + pc ≤ 1 since the events are
disjoint. We conclude that Pσs1[W ] = pa + pb ≤ pa + 12 · (1− pa) = 12 · pa + 12 ≤ 34 .
Lemma 12. Val(si) = 2
i+1
2i+1 for all i ≥ 0.
Proof. The case i = 0 is trivial, and i = 1 is Lemma 11. Solving the recurrence Val(si) = 23 ·Val(si−1)+
1
3 ·Val(si+1), given the initial conditions for i = 0,1, yields Val(si) =
2i+1
2i+1 .
In particular, for all i≥ 1, Val(si)> Val(ri), thus no optimal strategy may use transitions sn→rn, n≥
1. By Lemma 10, there are no optimal strategies in si.
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